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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of saving for retirement with contribution payments and
labor income as a benchmark for investments. We consider the retirement saving problem from
the point of view of a plan sponsor. The plan sponsor makes contribution payments to an
investment fund in order to save for the future retirement of an employee. The goal is to ensure
that the employee can continue his consumption pattern after retirement. As the consumption
habits of the employee are related to his wages, the plan sponsor considers the labor income of
the employee as a benchmark for investments.
Clearly, the plan sponsor is not only concerned about the welfare of the employee and also
wants to minimize his contribution payments. We formalize this in a multi-period retirement
saving model, where the plan sponsor makes a trade-o between the utility of low contribution
payments and the utility of high fund values at retirement, relative to the labor income of the
employee. The solution of the model reveals the optimal dynamic investment strategy and the
optimal funding policy of the plan sponsor.
The retirement saving model presented in this paper includes both a dened contributions
pension plan and a `nal pay' dened benets plan as special cases. The generality of the model
allows us to circumvent the large dierence in pension schemes throughout the world: we focus
on the core of the retirement saving problem. Clearly, not every plan sponsor or pension fund
considers labor income as a benchmark for investments. However, we believe that it is in the
interest of the employees to do so, without any adverse consequences.
An important assumption throughout the paper is that the labor income of the employee can
not be replicated with the available assets: consequently, the nancial market is incomplete.
Moreover, we assume that the wage growth rate is partly predictable. Given the basic model
setup, we derive optimal decision rules by applying dynamic programming. The optimal de-
cision rules specify the asset weights and the contribution payment as a function of the state
variables (the wealth-to-income ratio and the wage growth rate) and provide direct insight into
the underlying problem.
We are particularly interested in the following issues, which are relevant for retirement saving
and have not been studied adequately in the literature yet:
1. What is the magnitude of the demand for the hedge portfolio against random changes of
the wage growth rate?
2. What is the impact of contribution payments on the optimal asset allocation?
3. What is the optimal multi-period investment strategy for investment objectives based on
downside risk measures, which are very popular in practice?
With our implementation of the dynamic programming algorithm we were able to address these
three main questions about optimal investment and funding in the retirement saving model.
The conclusions to be drawn from our analysis and computational experiments are as follows:
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1. Regardless of his utility function, the plan sponsor invests in a hedge-portfolio against
random uctuations of the employee's labor income. The hedge portfolio depends on the
covariance of the asset returns with the wage growth rate. Whether the plan sponsor
dynamically changes his holdings of the hedge portfolio depends on the relative risk aversion
of the investment objective. Furthermore, the dynamic feature of the hedging strategy is
solely driven by wealth eects as substitution eects are absent in our economy. The
numerical results demonstrate that the correlation between asset returns and wage growth
has a substantial inuence on portfolio composition. Dynamic adjustments of the hedging
strategy due to changes of the wage growth rate are relatively small.
2. Contribution payments change the optimal investment strategy considerably, even for a
plan sponsor with constant relative risk aversion over fund value. The portfolio weights
are no longer constant and there is a strong tendency to gamble at low levels of wealth.
Intertemporal measurement of utility over wealth can reduce these gambling eects. We
also nd that contribution payments lead to a strong investment horizon eect. Moreover,
additional constraints on the funding policy can completely alter investment strategies.
3. Plan sponsors increase the weight of risky assets in the portfolio at low levels of wealth,
if they maximize the expected fund value subject to a penalty on downside-risk. This
gambling policy can be attributed to the increasing relative risk aversion property of the
downside-risk measure.
The insights gained from the basic retirement saving model studied in this paper may help plan
sponsors to formulate dynamic investment policies and choose reasonable objectives. Further-
more, the optimal decision-rules derived here can be implemented in simulation-based systems
for ALM, where additional market imperfections such as transaction costs could be added.
In order to place this paper in the literature, we could interpret the retirement saving problem
with labor income as an asset-liability management (ALM) problem. In the literature many
single-period ALM models have been studied (Sharpe and Tint 1990 and Leibowitz, Kogelman,
and Bader 1994). These models indicate that investors should take the correlation between assets
and liabilities into account, while deciding about the investment strategy. However, saving for
retirement typically involves a long-term investment goal, and one-period models are therefore
inappropriate due to stochastic opportunity sets and non-myopic preferences.
There is a large stream of literature about the application of stochastic programming methods
for multi-period ALM (see Mulvey and Ziemba 1998 for an overview). Stochastic programming
models formulate an accurate answer to the question: how to invest today, given optimal re-
course in the future? However, the optimal policies do not explicitly reveal the relation between
the decisions and the state-variables. Our main objective is to gain insight in optimal deci-
sion rules for portfolio choice and funding in a simple micro-economic model without market
imperfections.
1
Due to the focus on dynamic programming and micro-economic analysis this paper is related to
the individual consumption-investment literature, which we review in Section 2.3. Our retire-
1
The knowledge gained from a simple micro-economic ALM model might be applied for the formulation and
interpretation of normative stochastic programming models with additional market imperfections.
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ment saving model can be classied as a model with a stochastic opportunity set (predictable
wage growth), with both negative and positive consumption (the net contribution payment)
and without a riskless asset (due to market incompleteness). Koo (1999) analyzes a simple
discrete-time model with labor income for power utility (constant relative risk aversion) and
has to apply numerical techniques to solve it completely. As our model is more elaborate and
as we additionally want to study more general objectives than power utility, we clearly need a
numerical solution method.
Recently a number of consumption-investment models have been solved numerically in order to
study the impact of relevant, but analytically complicated, issues such as predictability, trans-
action costs and parameter uncertainty (Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado 1997, Balduzzi and
Lynch 1999a, Barberis 1999). Unfortunately the numerical techniques applied are specically
intended for power utility functions. An alternative approach is the approximation technique
of Campbell (1993), which can be used to solve general consumption-investment models quasi-
analytically. However, the derived investment policies do not converge to the optimal solutions
and could entail serious approximation errors (Campbell e.a. 1998).
In this paper we do not rely on simplifying assumptions or approximation techniques for the
computations. We introduce a implementation of the dynamic programming algorithm with
several improvements to increase the eÆciency of the method. The improvements include trans-
formation and interpolation of the value function, which are crucial to solve any investment
model with power or HARA-utility. As we apply dynamic programming, the optimal policies
are derived in feedback form and we acquire direct insight into the structure of the strategies.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the retirement saving model and
the main assumptions. Moreover, we review the literature and introduce our implementation of
the dynamic programming algorithm. In Section 3 we study the optimal investment strategies
in detail for dierent investment objectives. We show that the widely used class of downside-risk
measures leads to peculiar investment policies in a multi-period setting. In Section 4 we study
the additional eect of funding payments on the investment strategy. Section 5 concludes and
summarizes the paper.
2 Retirement Saving Model
2.1 Model Denition and Assumptions
In this section we introduce the model for retirement saving that will be studied in this paper.
We assume that a plan sponsor pays contributions in order to nance the retirement of an
employee at time T . The plan sponsor has established an investment fund with initial wealth
W
t
at time t = 0 in order to achieve the retirement goal at the planning horizon T . At the
beginning of each period t = 0; 1; :::; T   1 the plan sponsor decides either to add a contribution
payment of C
+
t
 0 to the fund or extract cash from the fund C
 
t
 0. We represent the net
cashow into the fund by C
t
= C
+
t
  C
 
t
.
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After the cash in- and outows a total amount of (W
t
+C
t
) is left for investment in the capital
market. There are I+1 assets available for investment in the economy at time t, each providing
a discretely compounded random return of R
i;t+1
at time t+1 for i = 0; 1; :::; I. Each period the
plan sponsor invests a fraction w
it
of the investment fund's wealth into asset i = 1; :::; I, while
the remaining fraction (1 
P
I
i=1
w
i
t
) is invested in asset 0.
The investment goal of the plan sponsor is to enable the employee to continue his consumption
habits after retirement. As the employee's consumption pattern is likely to be related to his labor
income, the plan sponsor considers the employee's wages at retirement I
T
as a benchmark for
investments. We assume that the plan sponsor measures wealth relative to the labor income of
the employee and maximizes a utility function U(F
T
; T ) over the relative fund value F
T
=W
T
=I
T
at retirement. The function U(F
T
; T ) is increasing and concave in the fund value F
T
.
Additionally, the plan sponsor tries to minimize his contribution payments by maximizing the
utility function V ( C
t
; I
t
; t) over the intertemporal payments C
t
for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1. The
function V (:; I
t
; t) is increasing and concave in its rst argument. Higher contribution pay-
ments therefore decrease the utility of the plan sponsor and increase the marginal utility of a
unit reduction in payments. We formalize the trade-o between fund value at retirement and
contribution payments in the following retirement saving model:
(RS) Retirement Saving Model
max
w
it
;C
t
E
0
"
T 1
X
t=0
V ( C
t
; I
t
; t) + U(W
T
=I
T
; T )
#
(1)
s:t: W
t+1
= ( W
t
+ C
t
)
 
I
X
i=1
w
it
(1 +R
i;t+1
) + (1 
I
X
i=1
w
it
)(1 +R
0;t+1
)
!
;(2)
for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1:
where  > 0 is a parameter inuencing the relative impact of utility over fund value F
T
=W
T
=I
T
at retirement T .
The general model for retirement saving needs a more detailed specication for a meaningful
analysis. As a rst building block, we will assume that the wage growth rate 
t
follows a
mean-reverting process:
Assumption 1 Labor income I
t
at time t grows with the continuously compounded wage growth
rate 
t+1
, which follows a mean-reverting process
I
t+1
= I
t
e

t+1
= I
t
(1 + 
t+1
)(3)

t+1
= (

  
t
) + 
t+1
; 
t+1
 IID(0; 
2

)(4)
where 
t+1
= 
t+1
  
t
, 0 <  < 1 is the mean reversion parameter, 

is the long run
mean wage growth rate and 
t+1
is an identically intertemporal independently distributed (IID)
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innovation with expectation zero and variance 
2

. For ease of exposition we also dene the
discrete wage growth rate 
t+1
= e

t+1
  1.
Secondly, we assume that the asset returns are not correlated intertemporally and imperfectly
correlated with the wage growth innovation:
Assumption 2 The joint distribution of the continuously compounded asset returns r
i;t+1
and
the wage growth innovation 
t+1
is equal in each period t = 0; 1; :::; T   1. The vector of mean
asset returns is  = f
i
g
I
i=0
and the covariance matrix is 
 = f
ij
g
I
i;j=0
. The correlation vector
of the asset returns with the wage growth innovation 
t+1
is denoted by 
I
= f
i
g
I
i=0
. The
asset returns are not correlated intertemporally: Cov(r
i;t+1
; r
i;t
) = 0 for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1. The
discretely compounded asset return is dened as R
i;t+1
= e
r
i;t+1
  1.
Assumption 2 implies that there is no direct compensation for wage growth in the nominal
asset returns, although the returns can still be imperfectly correlated with the wage growth
rate. Consequently, this assumption entails that there is no perfect hedge for wage ination: the
nancial market is incomplete.
Thirdly, we assume that the plan sponsor measures the utility of a contribution payment C
t
relative to employee's wage income I
t
at time t:
Assumption 3 The utility V over contribution payments is a function of time and the ratio
C
t
=I
t
only: V ( C
t
; I
t
; t) = H( C
t
=I
t
; t). We dene c
t
= C
t
=I
t
as the contribution rate relative
to the employee's labor income.
Assumption 3 allows us to reduce the state space of the retirement saving problem from three
variables (wealth W
t
, income I
t
and wage growth 
t
) to two variables (the wealth-income ratio
F
t
and wage growth 
t
). As a result the eort needed for solving the model reduces signicantly.
In our opinion this reduction of complexity makes up for the slight loss of generality. Moreover,
the assumption of utility over contribution rates is also made by Boender (1997) in a widely
used decision support system for pension funds.
In practice pension schemes are often categorized as either a dened contributions plan or a
dened benets plan. We would like to point out that our retirement saving model can include
both schemes as special cases. If we x the contribution payments C
t
at a constant non-
negative level, then we replicate a dened contributions scheme. The retirement saving model
also includes a `nal pay' dened benets scheme, where the plan sponsor guarantees to pay
M times the employee's labor income at retirement (i.e. MI
T
).
2
In the next sections we will
discuss solution methods for the retirement saving model.
2
In order to guarantee MI
T
at retirement, the plan sponsor either has to pay an additional amount of C
+
T
=
maxf0;MI
T
 W
T
g or he receives the redundant fund value C
 
T
= maxf0;W
T
 MI
T
g. Suppose that the plan
sponsor maximizes a utility function H(c
T
; T ) over the nal contribution rate c
T
= (MI
T
 W
T
)=I
T
=M   F
T
.
We can model this equivalently with a utility function U(F
T
; T ) over nal fund value F
T
, as in the objective (1)
of the retirement saving model.
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2.2 Dynamic Programming and First Order Conditions
A well-known solution technique for sequential decision problems under uncertainty is dynamic
programming (see Bellman 1957 and Bertsekas 1976). It is based on the observation that an
optimal policy for the entire sequential decision problem should also be optimal starting from
any given state at a later date. This property is known as the principle of optimality. Given
Assumption 1, 2 and 3, we can describe the state of the retirement fund at time t completely
with the relative fund value F
t
= W
t
=I
t
and the wage growth rate 
t
. Let the value function
J(F
t
; 
t
; t) denote the maximum expected utility obtainable for the nancial institution starting
at time t in state (F
t
; 
t
):
J(F
t
; 
t
; t) = max
w
it
;c
t
E
t
2
4
T 1
X
j=t
H(c
j
; j) + U(F
T
; T )
3
5
(5)
s:t: F
t+1
= ( F
t
+ c
t
)
 
I
X
i=1
w
it
(1 +R
i;t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)
+ (1 
I
X
i=1
w
it
)
(1 +R
0;t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)
!
;(6)
for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1:
The nancial institution's initial planning problem is dened by J(F
0
; 
0
; 0). Using the principle
of optimality, the dynamic programming algorithm derives this function recursively by solving
the following sequence of one-period problems:
J(F
t
; 
t
; t) = max
w
it
;c
t
f H(c
t
; t) + E
t
[J(F
t+1
; 
t+1
; t+ 1)] g;(7)
s:t: F
t+1
= ( F
t
+ c
t
)
 
I
X
i=1
w
it
(1 +R
i;t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)
+ (1 
I
X
i=1
w
it
)
(1 +R
0;t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)
!
;(8)
for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1:
where J(F
T
; 
T
; T ) = U(F
T
; T ).
We now state the rst order conditions of optimality for the investment and funding policies of
the retirement saving model, following from the dynamic programming equations (7):
0 = H
c
(c

t
; t) E
t

J
F
(F
t+1
; 
t+1
; t+ 1)
(1 +R

t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)

; for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1:(9)
0 = E
t

J
F
(F
t+1
; 
t+1
; t+ 1)
(R
i;t+1
 R
0;t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)

; for i = 1; :::; I and t = 0; 1; :::; T   1:(10)
where R

t+1
=
P
I
i=1
w

it
(R
i;t+1
 R
0;t+1
) +R
0;t+1
denotes the optimal portfolio return.
In general it is not easy to solve to rst order conditions for the optimal policies and in most
cases numerical techniques are required. Before we present our numerical method, we will rst
discuss related literature on optimal portfolio choice.
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2.3 Related Literature
The retirement saving model can be counted as a multi-period asset-liability management model,
if we interpret the employee's labor income at retirement as a liability. In the literature many
single-period ALM models have been studied (Sharpe and Tint 1990 and Leibowitz, Kogelman,
and Bader 1994). These models indicate that investors should take the correlation between
assets and liabilities into account, while deciding about the investment strategy. However,
pension funds typically have a long investment horizon, and one-period models are therefore
inappropriate in a context with stochastic opportunity sets or non-myopic preferences.
There is a large stream of literature about the application of stochastic programming methods
for multi-period ALM (see Mulvey and Ziemba 1998 for an overview). Stochastic programming
models formulate an accurate answer to the question: how to invest today, given optimal recourse
in the future? However, the optimal policies do not explicitly reveal the relation between the
decisions and the state-variables. Our main objective is to gain insight in optimal decision rules
for portfolio choice and funding in a simple micro-economic model without market imperfections.
Given our focus on a dynamic programming and micro-economic analysis, the discrete-time
individual consumption-investment literature is more closely related to this paper. Early refer-
ences are Hakansson (1970), Mossin (1968) and Samuelson (1969), which study a multi-period
consumption-investment problem for an investor with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA),
i.e. power utility. Under the additional assumption of intertemporally independent asset returns
they prove that the portfolio weights are equal in each period, independent of the individual's
age and wealth. The investment policies are called myopic as the investor behaves identical to
a single-period investor.
3
In a continuous time framework, where the time-step between consecutive decisions becomes in-
nitesimally small, Merton (1969,1971) conrms the ndings of Samuelson (1969) and Hakansson
(1969,1971).
4
Recent papers by DuÆe et al. (1997) and Koo (1998) apply the theory of viscos-
ity solutions to study a continuous time model with labor income and bankruptcy constraints.
A complete solution for HARA-utility (including CRRA as a special case) requires numerical
techniques, equivalently to the discrete-time case studied by Koo (1999). Another important
development in the eld is the martingale methodology of Pliska (1986), Karatzas, Lehockzky
and Shreve (1987) and Cox and Huang (1989). As the martingale methodology heavily relies on
a complete markets setting, it is not suited for our model with non-traded wage income.
5
3
Hakansson (1969,1971) generalizes the multi-period model further and adds stochastic wage income, serially
correlated asset returns and uncertainty about the individual's lifetime to the basic setup. All these results are
limited to CRRA or the class of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions with a negative
threshold parameter.
4
The closed-form solutions of Merton (1971) are limited to HARA-utility functions (including CRRA as a
special case), under the additional assumption that the asset prices can be described with geometric Brownian
motions. Sethi and Taksar (1988) have shown that some of the solutions in Merton (1971) are incorrect since
bankruptcy problems are ignored. Explicit constraints are necessary to prevent bankruptcy, and closed-form
solutions are more diÆcult to derive.
5
Some progress has been made in extending this methodology to incomplete markets (see He and Pearson
1991), however the non-uniqueness of an equivalent martingale measure causes serious complications.
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In the modern consumption-investment framework our retirement saving model can be classied
as a model with a stochastic opportunity set (predictable wage growth), with both negative and
positive consumption (the net contribution payment) and without a riskless asset (due to market
incompleteness). In the dened contributions case it reduces to a model without consumption
and with xed labor income (the constant contribution rate). Koo (1999) analyzes a simple
discrete-time model with labor income for power-utility, but has to apply numerical techniques
to solve it completely. As our model is more elaborate and as we additionally want to study
preferences outside the HARA class, we clearly need a numerical solution method.
Recently several authors have solved consumption-investment problems numerically in order to
investigate research questions that can not be addressed analytically. These numerical schemes
are often based on approximations or simulations and consider CRRA in order to facilitate cal-
culations. Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997) study the impact of time-varying expected
returns under power utility. Brandt (1999) studies the impact of stochastic opportunity sets
under power utility with an approximation based on the method of moments. Barberis (1999)
considers parameter uncertainty and uses simulations for power utility. Balduzzi and Lynch
(1999a,1999b) consider the impact of transactions costs and predictability using numerical tech-
niques for power utility.
Campbell (1993) introduces a simple approximation technique which allows for quasi-analytical
solutions of consumption-investment problems with recursive utility and stochastic opportunity
sets. The approximation is based on a log-linearization of the Euler equation and the budget
equation. As a result the optimal consumption and portfolio decisions are quadratic and lin-
ear in the state-variable respectively. Campbell and Viceira (1999a,1999b) and Viceira (1999)
have applied this technique to solve interesting consumption-investment problems approximately.
However, a disadvantage of the approximation method is that the derived solutions do not con-
verge to the optimal strategies.
6
Apart from serious approximation errors there are other drawback associated with the method
introduced by Campbell (1993). First, all the consumption-investment models considered have
an innite horizon, which greatly simplies the problem since the solutions no longer depend on
time. Second, it does not seem straightforward to take additional restrictions into account such as
limits on borrowing and constraints to prevent bankruptcy. We now propose a numerical solution
technique that does not suer from the drawbacks indicated above and moreover converges to
the optimal solution.
2.4 Implementation of the Discretized Dynamic Programming Algorithm
We apply a numerical solution technique for dynamic programming that is based on a discretiza-
tion of the state space, i.e. a grid for the values of the state variables F
t
and 
t
. For each point
on this grid we solve the dynamic programming equation (7) numerically for the optimal in-
vestment and funding decisions. Note that the required computations easily get out of hand, as
6
Campbell et al. (1998) show that the approximation error can indeed be quite large compared to a more
general approximation technique based on polynomial decision rules for consumption and investment.
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the expectation of next period's value function has to be integrated numerically. An additional
complicating factor is the curse of dimensionality: the size of the state grid grows exponentially
with the number of state variables.
We propose an implementation of the discretized dynamic programming algorithm with four
crucial additions that increase the eÆciency of the method:
1. Variance reduction techniques in order to improve Monte-Carlo simulations.
2. Interpolation of the value function in order to reduce the size of the grid.
3. Transformation of the value function in order to facilitate interpolation methods.
4. Fast numerical optimizations using restarts from neighboring grid points.
We apply Monte-Carlo simulation to calculate expectations over the return distributions, with
an additional variance reduction technique to reduce the approximation error of the simulation
method. We employ the method of antithetic sampling to replicate the mean of the underlying
asset return distributions. Additionally we rescale the entire sample of returns in order to t the
variance of the returns exactly. This particular variance reduction method seems appropriate, as
the mean and the variance of the return distributions play an essential role in portfolio selection.
Note that each simulated drawing from the distribution of the state variables tends to lie in
between the points on the grid at time t+ 1. In order to calculate the expectation at time t of
the value function at time t + 1 in equation (7) we require an estimate of the value function
in each simulated point. In the backward recursion of the dynamic programming algorithm we
already know the value function in all points on the grid at time t + 1. We can pick a point
on the grid that lies close to the simulated state, in order to obtain an estimate. Subsequently,
the expectation of the value function can be computed as the sample mean of all the simulated
estimates. Note that this simple version of the discretized dynamic programming algorithm
approximates the value function at time t+ 1 with a piecewise linear function.
A more smooth and accurate approximation of the value function can be achieved if we apply
interpolation methods. In order to facilitate interpolation we rst transform the value function to
a roughly linear shape with a power function (see Appendix B for details). Next we interpolate
the transformed value function in between grid points and apply the inverse transformation
to obtain the approximation. The transformation of the value function is crucial to ensure
accurate interpolation of utility functions with a vertical asymptote (e.g. power and HARA
utility functions), which would otherwise require extremely ne-grained grids.
We interpolate the transformed value function with a local rational polynomial, which is a reli-
able and accurate method for nearly any functional form (see Press et al. 1989). Unfortunately
the rational interpolation method is rather slow. Therefore, we calculate the scaled second
derivative of the transformed value function to determine whether the function is locally linear.
Depending on the value of this scaled second derivative we either apply rational, polynomial or
linear interpolation (see Appendix B). We have tested this interpolation-rule on a number of
functions and found that it provides a nice combination of reliability and eÆciency.
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Finally, we exploit Powell's method (Press et al. 1989) for the numerical optimizations in the
dynamic programming equation (7). The computation-times can be cut drastically by using the
optimal policy of a neighboring grid point as initial guess for the optimization method. Note
that Powell's method does not explicitly handle bounds on the decision variables. However, we
can still impose lower and upper bounds on the variables by simple transformations with an
exponential or arctangent function.
Our implementation of the discretized dynamic programming algorithm converges to the optimal
solution, given a number of mild continuity assumptions about the utility functions. Convergence
in this context means that the numerical approximation of the value function at time t = 0 will
get arbitrarily close to the actual value function, as the distance between points on the grid
becomes smaller. We refer to Bertsekas (1976) for a convergence proof of the discretized dynamic
programming algorithm without interpolation schemes. With the additional use of interpolation
it can easily be shown that this proof still holds, if we ensure that the interpolation estimates
stay within the boundaries of surrounding function values on the grid.
We have tested our implementation of the discretized dynamic programming algorithm by com-
paring numerical results with known analytical solutions and found satisfactory results. In
practice the implementation allows us to solve problems with two state variables accurately and
eÆciently on a desktop PC. In the next two sections we will apply our algorithm in order to
investigate the three main research questions which are listed in the Introduction.
3 Investment Policies for Retirement Saving
3.1 Portfolio Separation and Liability Hedging Credits
We try to gain insight in the optimal policies of the retirement saving model by analysing dierent
parts in isolation. In this section we focus on optimal investment policies in a model without
contribution payments, while in Section 4 we will investigate the additional eect of funding
decisions. Mostly we will apply our numerical method to solve the model completely, except for
the special case of a CRRA investor. Throughout the following sections we will assume that the
discrete asset returns and the wage growth are log-normally distributed:
Assumption 4 The joint distribution of the continuously compounded asset returns r
i;t+1
and
the wage growth innovation "
t+1
is multi-variate normal in each period t = 0; 1; :::; T   1, with a
constant mean vector and a constant covariance matrix (see Assumption 2). Consequently, the
discrete returns (1 +R
i;t+1
) = e
r
i;t+1
and the discrete wage growth (1 + 
i;t+1
) = e

t+1
follow a
multi-variate log-normal distribution.
Before we apply our numerical technique to solve the retirement saving model completely, we
rst pay some attention to the general structure of investment strategies. First of all, the
correlation of the asset returns with the wage growth rate is very important for investments in
the retirement saving model. We can observe this by studying the variance of the asset returns
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in excess of the wage growth (r
i;t+1
  
t+1
), which drive the development of the relative fund
value F
t
:
V ar(r
i;t+1
  
t+1
) = 
2
i
  2
i
+ 
2

:(11)
The variance of the excess return decreases as an asset provides higher covariance with wage
growth. This eect is related to the concept of liability hedging credits, introduced by Sharpe
and Tint (1990): the investor is willing to accept lower expected returns in exchange for more
protection against random uctuations of the wage growth rate.
In order to provide more insight into the optimal investment strategies, we prove in Appendix C
that three fund separation (12) holds for any investment objective, given Assumption 4, a linear
approximation of continuously compounded returns and the assumption that asset 0 is riskless:
w

t
=  
E
t
[J
F
]
F
t
E
t
[J
FF
]


 1
(  r
0
) +

1 
E
t
[J
F
]
F
t
E[J
FF
]



 1

I
(12)
where w

t
is the vector of optimal portfolio weights.
The optimal asset weights of the plan sponsor can be separated into a market portfolio, a hedge
portfolio for the wage growth rate and a riskless portfolio. The fund separation result also holds
for investors who minimize the variance of the fund value return V ar(F
t+1
=F
t
) subject to a given
expected return E[F
t+1
=F
t
], if we ignore the part
E
t
[J
F
]
F
t
E[J
FF
]


 1

I
in (12). This particular part
of the investment strategy represents the intertemporal hedge against predictable changes of the
wage growth through time, which is clearly missing in a one-period model. In the next section we
will quantify the investment strategy numerically, without the simplifying assumptions needed
for the fund separation result.
3.2 Constant and Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion
The portfolio separation result holds for any investment objective, but does not provide a com-
plete solution as the investment rule depends on the unknown value function J(F
t
; 
t
; t). In
order to learn more about the optimal investment strategies we will now study the special case
of constant relative risk aversion. We assume that the plan sponsor maximizes a power utility
function over the relative fund value F
T
at the retirement date T :
U(F
T
; T ) = (1 + )
 T
1

(F
T
)

;(13)
R
U
(F
T
; T ) =
 F
T
U
FF
(F
T
; T )
U
F
(F
T
; T )
= 1  (14)
where  < 1 is the relative risk aversion coeÆcient and  > 0 is the intertemporal discount
factor.
Retirement Saving with Contribution Payments and Labor Income as a Benchmark 12
The function R
U
(F
T
; T ) in (14) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, which is
constant for power utility. In a simple investment model with one risky asset and one riskless
asset the portfolio weight of the risky asset increases (decreases) as a function of wealth, if the
relative risk aversion is decreasing (increasing) in wealth. An investor with constant relative
risk aversion does not change the risky asset weight and chooses a constant portfolio. It is
not obvious whether these results also hold for the retirement saving model, as it additionally
includes a stochastic opportunity set and contribution payments.
In Appendix A we derive the following result for the power utility objective (13), under the
additional assumption of zero contribution rates c
t
= 0 for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1:
dw

it
dF
t
= 0 and
dw

it
d
t
= 0; for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1 and i = 0; 1; :::; I:(15)
where w

it
denotes the optimal asset weight for i = 0; 1; :::; I.
We conclude from (15) that the plan sponsor does not adjust the portfolio weights if the fund
value or the wage growth changes, in the case with a CRRA objective and without intertemporal
contribution payments. Note that wage growth does not aect the drift rate and the volatility
of the asset returns in our economy and therefore substitution between assets as a result of a
change of the wage growth is needless. Wealth eects are present, but have no consequence for
portfolio choice as we consider an investor with constant relative risk aversion.
We will now study utility functions with decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), in order to
investigate whether the optimal investment strategies are indeed dierent. We introduce the
following class of utility functions with DRRA, which can be applied in our economy without
causing feasibility problems:
7
U(F
T
; T ) = (1 + )
 T

1
  p
F
 p
T
+



F

T
;(16)
R
U
(F; T ) =  F
T
U
FF
(F
T
; T )
U
F
(F
T
; T )
=
(1  + p) + (1  )F
p
T
1 + F
p
T
:(17)
where  < 1, p > 0 and  > 0 are constant parameters.
It is easy to prove that U
F
(F
T
; T ) > 0, U
FF
(F
T
; T ) < 0 and R
U
F
(F
T
; T ) < 0 hold: U is a
utility function with DRRA. If F
T
is close to zero then the relative risk aversion coeÆcient
equals (1      p), while it decreases monotonically to (1   ) as the fund value increases to
innity. Figure 1 shows a graph of the relative risk aversion function (17) for the parameter
values  =  0:5, p = 3 and  = 3.
7
HARA-utility functions with a positive sustenance level  > 0 also have the property of DRRA, however we
can not apply them in our incomplete market as they would cause bankruptcy problems (the constraint F
t
> 
of the HARA-utility function can not be satised under all circumstances).
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We would like to investigate the impact of DRRA on optimal investment strategies, however
analytical solutions are not readily available under this particular utility specication and there-
fore we rely on our numerical method. First we specify the coeÆcients that will be used in all
numerical examples from now on:
Assumption 5 For the numerical cases we consider a retirement fund 10 years before the
retirement date, i.e. T = 10. The discount rate  is 2% per year. The initial wealth of the
fund is W
0
= 1 and the initial labor income of the employee is I
0
= 1. At the beginning of
each period t = 0; 1; :::; T   1 the plan sponsor can adjust the asset portfolio of the retirement
fund. Two assets are available for investing, a risky bond and a risky stock. There is no riskless
asset and short selling is not allowed. Consequently, the asset weights of the bond and the stock
are within 0% and 100%. The asset returns are jointly log-normally distributed with expected
returns 
B
= 6:8% and 
S
= 8:6% for the bond and the stock respectively, standard deviations

B
= 5:9% and 
S
= 15:7% and a correlation of 
BS
= +0:38. The long run mean wage growth
rate is 

= 5:7% , the mean reversion parameter equals  = 0:31 and the standard deviation
is 

= 3%. We will make specic assumptions about the correlation between asset returns and
wage growth later on.
These parameters for the distribution of the asset returns and the wage growth rate are based on
a Dutch yearly dataset from the period 1956-1994 (see Kouwenberg 1998). We only consider two
risky assets in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results. We now apply the discretized
dynamic programming algorithm and solve the retirement saving model with DRRA numerically:
Case 3.1 We solve the retirement saving model with DRRA utility function (16) for  =  0:5,
p = 3 and  = 3. As a benchmark, we also solve the model with CRRA objective (13), for
 =  0:5 and  =  3:5. In order to distinguish the impact of the objective we ignore uncertainty
about labor income in this example: the wage growth rate is xed at 
t
= 3% annually. We
apply the discretized dynamic programming algorithm on a grid consisting of 36 equally spaced
fund values F = 0 to F = 3:5 (step size 0:1). Expectations over the return distribution are
approximated with 10000 simulation points:
Figure 2 shows the optimal proportion invested in stocks at time t = 0, as a function of initial
fund value. The investment strategy is clearly myopic for the two constant relative risk aversion
cases  =  0:5 and  =  3:5, demonstrating the convergence of the numerical algorithm. With
decreasing relative risk aversion the weight of stocks increases from 28% to 90%. It is clear that
this optimal investment strategy can be explained quite well by the corresponding decreasing
relative risk aversion function in Figure 1.
We will now additionally investigate the impact of uncertainty about the wage growth rate. We
already know that a plan sponsor with CRRA utility follows a myopic investment strategy, as
there is no substitution between assets in our economy if the wage growth changes. Note that
a change of the wage growth rate does inuence the expected fund value. Consequently, we
hypothesize that a plan sponsor with DRRA hedges intertemporally against changes of wage
growth, as his investment strategy is inuenced by changes in (expected) wealth. We will now
demonstrate this eect numerically:
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Case 3.2 The plan sponsor maximizes DRRA utility function (16) with parameter values  =
 0:5, p = 3 and  = 3. Additionally, the wage growth rate 
t
is stochastic, with the parameters
specied in Assumption 5. For the correlation between wage growth and asset returns we consider
two cases: 1. bond returns are positively correlated with wage growth, while stock returns are
uncorrelated (
B
= +1=3 and 
S
= 0) and 2. the opposite case (
B
= 0 and 
S
= +1=3).
We apply the discretized dynamic programming algorithm on a two-dimensional grid for the
state variables consisting of 36 equally spaced fund values F = 0 to F = 3:5 (step size 0:1) and
17 wage growth rates  =  0:10 to  = +0:22 (step size 0:02). Expectations over the return
distribution are approximated with 10000 simulation points:
Figure 3 shows the optimal stock proportion at time 0 as a function of fund value and the initial
wage growth rate, in the case that bond returns are positively correlated with wage ination.
We observe two major eects. First, the fraction invested in stocks increases as the fund value
becomes larger: this is the familiar result for DRRA. Second, an increase in the expected wage
growth leads to a larger proportion of bonds in the portfolio in order to hedge against the
expected reduction of future wealth, as we hypothesized earlier.
Figure 4 displays the results for the case where stock returns are positively correlated with the
wage growth rate. We clearly observe that the fraction invested in stocks increases at any level
of fund value and wage ination, compared to the situation in Figure 3. This parallel shift of
the investment strategy can be explained by the increased liability hedging credits of stocks. If
we concentrate on the dynamic hedging strategy, the results in Figures 3 and 4 are similar: an
increase of expected wage growth reduces the proportion of stocks in the portfolio, regardless of
the underlying correlation structure.
3.3 The V-Shaped Consequences of Downside-Risk Measures
In practice a popular objective is to maximize the expected fund value, subject to a penalty if
wealth drops below the investment benchmark, i.e. a penalty on downside-risk. Downside-risk
measures have been introduced as a substitute for standard risk measures such as variance, as
it seems unreasonable to penalize negative and positive deviations from the benchmark equally.
Popular measures include: shortfall probability, expected shortfall and semivariance (see Bawa
and Lindenberg 1977).
In this section we study the optimal investment strategy if the plan sponsor maximizes the
expected fund value at retirement, subject to a quadratic penalty if he fails to outperform the
investment benchmark (i.e., if F
T
< 1):
max
w
it
E
0
[U(F
T
; T )] =
1
(1 + )
T
 
E
0
[F
T
]   E
0
[minf0; 1   F
T
g
2
]

(18)
where U(F
T
; T ) = (1 + )
 T
 
F
T
  minf0; 1   F
T
g
2

and  > 0 is a constant risk aversion
parameter .
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In the normative ALM literature for pension funds the downside-risk concept is highly successful
and seems to have replaced traditional utility functions. Investors that try to meet their liabilities
usually apply a threshold of 1 for the funding ratio, i.e. the ratio of assets to liabilities. Even
regulating authorities nowadays advocate the use of downside-risk measures to improve the
solvency of institutional investors. Not much attention has been paid however to the optimal
investment strategies for downside-risk objectives in a multi-period model.
Downside-risk averse investors can be considered as expected utility maximizers with a risk-
neutral (linear) utility function above the threshold F
T
= 1 and a utility function with increasing
relative risk aversion (IRRA) below the threshold. The eect of IRRA below the threshold might
be gambling behavior: a decrease of wealth increases the portfolio weight of stocks. Furthermore
risk-neutrality above the threshold should lead to a strong increase in the demand for stocks.
Consequently, in a two-asset economy we expect a V-shaped gure if we draw the optimal stock
weight as a function of fund value F
t
. We will now solve the retirement saving model numerically
in order to investigate these eects.
Case 3.3 We solve the retirement saving model with downside-risk objective (18) for risk aver-
sion values  = 16 and  = 64. In order to distinguish the impact of the investment objective
clearly we ignore uncertainty about labor income: the wage growth rate is xed at 
t
= 3%. We
apply the discretized dynamic programming algorithm on a grid consisting of 36 equally spaced
fund values F = 0 to F = 3:5 (step size 0:1). Expectations over the return distributions are
approximated with 10000 simulation points.
Figure 5 shows the optimal initial weight of stocks for risk aversion levels  = 16 and  =
64. The optimal investment strategy has a clear V-shape: at low wealth levels the weight of
stocks decreases, while it increases at higher wealth levels. We nd equivalent results for other
downside-risk measures such as expected shortfall and shortfall probability, which have a similar
relative risk aversion function. Given the wide-spread acceptance of downside-risk measures it
is questionable whether investors are fully aware of the accompanying gambling behavior at low
wealth levels.
4 Consumption and Funding Decisions
4.1 The Eect of Funding Payments
In the previous section we have ignored contribution payments by the plan sponsor, while we
focused on optimal investment strategies for the retirement saving model with labor income as a
benchmark. In this section we study the additional eect of funding payments on the retirement
saving problem. As a rst example, we consider the impact of a xed non-negative contribution
payment.
Case 4.1 We solve the retirement saving model with a xed contribution rate c
t
= 0:05 for
t = 0; 1; :::; T   1. The utility over fund value at retirement is CRRA (13) with  =  3:5,  2
Retirement Saving with Contribution Payments and Labor Income as a Benchmark 16
and  0:5. We ignore uncertainty about labor income in this example: the wage growth rate is
xed at 
t
= 3% annually. The grid of the discretized dynamic programming algorithm consists
of 36 equally spaced fund values F = 0 to F = 3:5 (step size 0:1) and the return distributions
are approximated with 10; 000 simulation points:
Figure 6 displays the optimal investment strategy at time t = 0 for the three levels of risk
aversion. Due to the contribution payments, the portfolio weight of stocks is decreasing as a
function of fund value for  =  2 and  3:5 and the weight is always at the upper bound for
 =  0:5. The plan sponsor appreciates the xed payment more at low fund values than at
high fund values (i.e. marginal utility of the contribution payment decreases). Poor returns on
investments therefore have less impact on utility at low fund levels than at high fund values,
which explains the decreasing optimal portfolio weight of stocks for  =  2 and  3:5.
We will now study the case where the plan sponsor can change the contribution payments
intertemporally. Clearly, the plan sponsor has to make a trade-o between low contribution
payments and high fund values at retirement. Given Assumption 3, we formalize this as a
trade-o between the utility H(c
t
; t) of contribution rates c
t
and the utility U(F
T
; T ) of fund
value at retirement. A widely used and intuitively attractive way for modelling preferences over
contribution payments is to minimize the expected net present value. In our framework this can
be specied as H( c
t
; t) =  c
t
=(1 + )
t
, subject to the xed bounds c c
t
 c. Note however
that interior solutions never occur: the optimal contribution rate c

t
is always at the lower or
upper bound: c

t
=c or c

t
= c.
Instead of the net present value rule, the plan sponsor can specify an increasing and strictly con-
cave utility function H( c
t
; t) over contribution rates. We know that if H( c
t
; t) and U(F
T
; T )
are both power utility functions with equal risk aversion coeÆcient, then the funding policy is
linear and the investment strategy is myopic.
8
However, power utility enforces the constraint
 c
t
> 0 and the plan sponsor will only extract cash from the fund. We will investigate HARA-
utility (19) for the contribution rates, as it allows the plan sponsor to make payments c
t
> 0:
H( c
t
; t) =
1  


 c
t
+ c
(1  )


;  1  c
t
< c(19)
where  < 1 is the risk aversion coeÆcient and c > 0 is the upper bound of the contribution
rate.
The HARA-utility function H( c
t
; t) is increasing and concave in its rst argument and enforces
the upper bound c > 0 on contribution rates. Moreover it has the property of increasing relative
risk aversion (IRRA). We investigate in Case 4.2 whether this property inuences the investment
strategy:
Case 4.2 We solve the retirement saving model with HARA-utility (19) for contribution rates,
with risk aversion parameters  =  1:5, 2 and  2:5 and upper bound c = 0:1. The utility
8
This result holds in a consumption-investment model with constant opportunity sets and a risk free asset, see
Hakansson (1969), Mossin (1968) and Samuelson (1969).
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function over fund value at retirement is CRRA with  =  2. The trade-o parameter between
utility over contribution rates and fund value is  = 250; 000. We choose this value for  to
make sure that contribution rate is positive for funding levels F  1.
Before we discuss the results, we rst explain why the value 250; 000 is reasonable for . The
parameter  inuences the trade-o between utility over contribution rates and fund value in
the objective function. In numerical experiments we have found that the impact of  on the
optimal solution is limited to the slope of the contribution rates as a function of fund value.
As positive contribution rates take on values between 0 and 0:10 (given upper bound c = 0:1),
we require a high value for the trade-o parameter  to get positive contribution rates at fund
values F  1.
Figure 8 displays the optimal contribution rate c
t
at time t = 0 as a function of initial fund value
F
t
, for the cases  =  1:5,  2 and  2:5. The optimal contribution rates are decreasing linearly
as function of fund value, while higher risk aversion  over contribution rates leads to lower
rates. Figure 7 shows the investment strategy at time t = 0 and we nd the same decreasing
stock weight pattern as in the case of a xed contribution rate (see Figure 6), although more
pronounced.
4.2 Horizon Eects and Gambling
So far we have displayed the optimal investment and contribution strategy at time t = 0. We
now study to what extent the optimal strategies change as the retirement date T approaches.
In the case of CRRA over fund value and without contribution payments, the asset weights are
constant through time. For DRRA, Figure 9 shows the optimal investment strategy at times
t = 9, 4 and 0 (based on Case 3.1). We nd that the weight of stocks increases with the
investment horizon for fund levels between F = 0:4 and F = 2.
In the case of a xed contribution rate horizon eects are even present for a CRRA investor.
Figure 10 shows the optimal stock weight at times t = 9, 4 and 0, for a CRRA objective with a
xed contribution rate c
t
= 0:05 for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1 (based on Case 4.1). One period before
retirement (t = 9) the investment strategy is still constant, while we observe a drastic increase
of the stock weight at low fund values for longer investment horizons (t = 4 and t = 0).
With exible contribution rates and HARA-utility (19), the horizon eect is even stronger.
Figure 11 shows the optimal stock weight at times t = 9, 4 and 0, for HARA-utility over
contribution rates with  =  2 and c = 0:1 and with a CRRA objective over fund value with
 =  2 (based on Case 4.2). The corresponding contribution rules are displayed in Figure 12.
We nd that the contribution rates tend to decrease as we move further from the retirement
date, while the stock weight at low fund levels increases.
We have shown that the payment of intertemporal contributions to the retirement fund leads
to a gambling strategy: the plan sponsor prefers a high proportion of stocks at low fund levels.
Moreover, the gambling becomes worse for longer horizons. This investment behavior might be
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considered imprudent, most notably in the case of a dened benets pension scheme. We will
now demonstrate that the propensity to gamble can be reduced considerably if the plan sponsor
cares about intertemporal fund values F
t
at times t = 1; 2; :::; T   1 before the planning horizon
T . We rst introduce the following objective for the plan sponsor, with intertemporal utility
over fund values:
max
w
it
;c
t
E
0
"
T 1
X
t=0
H(c
t
; t) + 
T
X
t=1
U(F
t
; t)
#
(20)
One might argue that it is not rational for the plan sponsor to worry about fund value before
the actual retirement date T . Note however that solvency requirements could force the plan
sponsor to do so, specially in the case of a dened benets pension plan. In the next case we
calculate investment strategies for an objective with intertemporal utility over fund values:
Case 4.3 We solve the retirement saving model with CRRA utility for fund values, measured
intertemporally according to (20), with  =  2. The utility function over contribution rates is
HARA (19), with risk aversion parameters  =  2 and upper bound c = 0:1. The trade-o
parameter between utility over contribution rates and fund value is  = 250; 000. We choose this
value for  to make sure that contribution rate is positive for funding levels F < 1.
Figure 13 and 14 show the optimal investment and contribution policy. From Figure 13 it is
clear that the optimal weight of stocks is still slightly higher at low fund levels, however the
eect has reduced considerably and can hardly be considered a pure gambling strategy anymore.
Figure 14 is also interesting, as it show that the horizon eect for the contribution rates has
reversed: as the retirement date T gets nearer, the plan sponsor pays less contributions. We
conclude that a focus on fund value before the retirement date can reduce the gambling behavior
induced by contribution payments.
4.3 Constraints on the Funding Policies
In practice the contribution rate might be constrained by explicit restrictions (see Boender
1997). The HARA-function (19) naturally imposes an upper bound on the funding payment
as marginal utility approaches  1 near the level c. We now consider the additional eect of
a lower bound on funding payments (c
t
>c), which we enforce in the implementation of the
discretized dynamic programming algorithm.
Case 4.4 We solve the problem of Case 4.2 again, with the addition of a lower bound c= 0 on
funding payments (i.e. the plan sponsor can not extract cash from the fund). The upper bound
equals c = 0:1 and the risk aversion coeÆcients of the utility functions H(c
t
; t) and U(F
T
; T )
are  =  2 and  =  2.
With an additional lower bound the optimal contribution rate is decreasing linearly as a function
of the fund value until it hits the lower bound c= 0 at F
0
= 1:5 and from thereon it remains
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constant. In contrast to this predictable result, the optimal investment strategy displayed in
Figure 15 is more surprising. The stock weight rst decreases to a minimum around F
0
= 1:9
and from this point onwards it starts to rise, up to 100%.
The declining stock weight pattern before the contribution rate reaches the lower bound can
be explained by the IRRA property of the HARA-function (19) over contribution rates. The
increasing stock weight trend in the right side of the graph can be interpreted as a gambling
policy: the potential losses of stocks become less important as the funding payment is stuck at
an involuntary `high' level (providing a cushion for possible losses) while the potential gains of
stocks remain the same.
Another interesting constraint on the funding policy is one induced by a maximum allowable
level of the fund value. Suppose that the plan sponsor decides that the value of the retirement
fund should never exceed F times the labor income of the employee, as this fund value is already
suÆcient to provide a good retirement income. Consequently, if the fund value F
t
exceeds the
`saturation' level F , then the plan sponsor extracts cash from the fund (i.e. c
t
< 0) in order to
reduce the fund value back to F .
Case 4.5 We consider Case 4.2, with the addition of a maximum fund level at F = 2. The risk
aversion coeÆcients are  =  =  2 and the upper bound for funding c = 0:1.
The optimal funding policy in this case is piecewise linear: at fund values above F = 2 the
plan sponsor extract large amounts of cash from the fund. The eect on the optimal investment
strategy is depicted in Figure 16. For low fund values the optimal stock weight is decreasing up
to F = 2, remaining at the minimum of 12% from thereon. As a consequence of the maximum
fund level, the plan sponsor drastically reduces stock exposure at wealthy fund values. The gains
of investing in stocks at high fund values are reduced by refunds, while the losses of investing in
stocks still loom as large as before.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied a retirement saving model with labor income as a benchmark for invest-
ments and periodic contribution payments by the plan sponsor. Due to market incompleteness it
is very hard to derive closed-form solutions for the optimal investment and contribution policies
of the plan sponsor. We introduced an eÆcient implementation of the dynamic programming
algorithm in order to solve the problem numerically. The main conclusions to be drawn from
our analysis and computational experiments are as follows:
1. Regardless of his utility function, the plan sponsor invests in a hedge-portfolio against
random uctuations of the employee's labor income. The hedge portfolio depends on the
covariance of the asset returns with the wage growth rate. Whether the plan sponsor
dynamically changes his holdings of the hedge-portfolio depends on the relative risk aversion
of the investment objective. Furthermore, the dynamic feature of the hedging strategy is
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solely driven by wealth eects as substitution eects are absent in our economy. The
numerical results demonstrate that the correlation between asset returns and wage growth
has a substantial inuence on portfolio composition. Dynamic adjustments of the hedging
strategy due to changes of the wage growth rate are relatively small.
2. Contribution payments change the optimal investment strategy considerably, even for a
plan sponsor with constant relative risk aversion over fund value. The portfolio weights
are no longer constant and there is a strong tendency to gamble at low levels of wealth.
Intertemporal measurement of utility over wealth can reduce these gambling eects. We
also nd that contribution payments lead to a strong investment horizon eect. More-
over, additional constraints on the funding policy can have a large impact on the optimal
investment strategy.
3. Plan sponsors increase the weight of risky assets in the portfolio at low levels of wealth,
if they maximize the expected fund value subject to a penalty on downside-risk. The
gambling policy can be attributed to the increasing relative risk aversion property of the
downside-risk measure.
The conclusions of this paper have important implications. The insights gained through the
numerical computations in this paper may aid fund-managers to formulate dynamic policies and
choose reasonable investment objectives. Furthermore, the decision-rules derived here could
be applied in simulation-based models for asset-liability management, where additional market
imperfections such as transaction costs and position limits can be taken into account.
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A Investment under Constant Relative Risk Aversion
In order to learn more about the optimal investment strategies, we study the case of constant
relative risk aversion in this appendix. We assume that the plan sponsor maximizes a power
utility function (13) over the funding ratio F
T
at the planning horizon T . As can be inferred
from (14), the power utility function displays constant relative risk aversion. We will now prove
that this feature implies that the fraction invested in each asset is independent of the funding
ratio and the wage growth rate.
If we dierentiate the rst-order condition (10) with respect to F
t
, then we obtain the following
expression:
dw

it
dF
t
=  
E
t
h
J
FF
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(21)
Using the relative risk aversion function we can formulate the change in demand for asset i as
follows:
dw

it
dF
t
=
1
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Similarly we can study the general eect of a change in the current ination rate on the optimal
investment strategy by studying the derivative dw

it
=d
t
. Dierentiating the rst-order condition
(10) with respect to 
t
we obtain:
dw

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We know that the value function at time T : J(F
T
; 
T
; T ) = H(F
T
; T ). Hence, we can conclude
from (22) and the rst order condition (10) that:
dw

i;T 1
dF
T 1
=
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= 0(24)
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Moreover at time T the value function is independent of the ination rate and hence from (23)
and the rst order condition (10):
dw
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i;T 1
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Let a(
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) = E
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h
1+R
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T
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, then the value-
function at time T   1 is given by
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(26)
Next, it is straightforward to show that
da(
T 1
)
d
T 1
=  (1   )a(
T 1
) and hence we have the
following relation:
J
F
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(1  )J
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Hence from (22) and (23) we may conclude that
dw
i;T 2
dF
T 2
= 0 and
dw
i;T 2
d
T 2
= 0:(28)
Recursively working backward and repeating the same steps we therefore derive that
dw
it
dF
t
= 0 and
dw
it
d
t
= 0; for t = 0; : : : ; T   1:(29)
Hence, the investor with constant relative risk aversion ignores future asset returns and does
not hedge dynamically against uctuations in the wage growth rate. Note that this conclusion
diers from the standard result in the literature for investors with CRRA facing a stochastic
opportunity set. However, in our economy the wage growth does not aect the drift rate and the
volatility of the asset returns and therefore substitution between assets as a result of a change
of the wage growth is needless. Wealth eects are present, but have no consequence for the
portfolio choice of an investor with CRRA.
B Implementation of the Dynamic Programming Algorithm
In this appendix we specify the decision rules for interpolation and transformation that were used
to solve the numerical cases in the paper with the discretized dynamic programming algorithm.
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First we consider the cases without stochastic wage growth. Let n = 0; 1; :::; N represent the
points on the grid for the fund value F (wealth-to-income ratio), with a xed step size of 
F
between the N + 1 points and minimum fund value F . Let J(n; t) denote the value function in
point n = 0; 1; :::; N on the grid at time t = 0; 1; :::; T .
Suppose that we are at time t in the dynamic programming algorithm and want to know the
value function at F

at time t+1 (in order to approximate the expectation of the value function
numerically). Let n

denote the point on the grid with fund value closest to F

: n

= b(F

 
F )=
F
c. We apply interpolation with points surrounding n

, as F

tends to lie in between
the available fund values F + nF on the grid for n = 0; 1; :::; N , . Moreover, in some cases
F

is larger than the maximum fund value on the grid (F

> F + N
F
) and then we apply
extrapolation.
In order to facilitate both interpolation and extrapolation for utility functions with a vertical
asymptote, we rst transform the value-function: y(n; t) = H(J(n; t)), where H(:) is an invert-
ible transformation-function. The goal of the transformation is to get rid of the asymptote at
low fund values near F (in order to improve the quality of interpolation) and to get a roughly
linear function at high fund values (in order to improve the quality of extrapolation).
Note that the utility function U(F
T
; T ) over fund value at retirement is crucial for the asymptote
of the value function and not the utility function over contribution rates H(c
t
; t). As the plan
sponsor controls the contribution rate c
t
he will never let the utility function over contribution
rates go to minus innity at a faster rate than the value function itself (at low levels of wealth
F !F ). Below is a list of the transformations applied for the cases studied in the paper:
1. Power and DRRA utility over fund values, see the specication in (16):
9
y(n; t) = J(n; t)
1=( p)
for n
F
 0:5 and
y(n; t) = J(n; t)
1=
for n
F
> 0:5.
2. Expected fund value subject to a downside-risk penalty, see the specication in (18):
no transformation required (no vertical asymptote)
Before we interpolate or extrapolate the transformed value function we would like to know its
shape near F

. Therefore we estimate the scaled second derivative of the transformed value
function. Let y(n; t + 1) denote a numerical estimate for the rst derivative of y(n; t + 1) at
time t+1 with respect to fund value F , while 
2
y(n; t+1) is a numerical estimate of the second
derivative of the transformed value function.
10
The estimate of the scaled second derivative
9
Power utility is a special case of DRRA with p = 0 and  = 0.
10
We use a mid-point formula to calculate numerical estimates for the points n = 2; 3; ::; N   2. For the points
on the edge of the grid, n = 0; 1 and n = N  1; N , we use a one-sided approximation of the derivatives (see Press
e.a. 1989).
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(absolute risk aversion) is:
z(n; t+ 1) =

2
y(n; t+ 1)
y(n; t+ 1)
; for n = 0; 1; :::; N:(30)
Depending on the magnitude of the scaled second derivative we choose an interpolation method.
Interpolation with a local rational polynomial is a good method for nearly any function, even
with an asymptote (see Press e.a. 1989), however it is rather slow. If we know that the value
function is locally linear then we rather apply a fast linear interpolation scheme with two points.
Moreover, if the value function has an abrupt change in the second derivative due to a `break' (as
in the case of downside-risk measures near the threshold) it is safer to apply linear interpolation.
We use a decision rule for choosing the interpolation method, in order to increase the eÆciency
of the algorithm without sacricing its reliability. Extensive numerical testing of eÆciency and
reliability resulted in the following specication:
1. Power and DRRA utility over fund values:
If F

> F +N
F
then we apply linear extrapolation with 2 points.
If jz(n

; t+ 1)j > 4:5 then we apply rational interpolation with 10 points.
If 0:5 < jz(n

; t+ 1)j  4:5 then we apply polynomial interpolation with 4 points.
If jz(n

; t+ 1)j  0:5 then we apply linear interpolation with 2 points.
2. Expected fund value subject to a downside-risk penalty:
If F

> F +N
F
then we apply linear extrapolation with 2 points.
If F

< 0:9 and jz(n

; t+ 1)j > 0:5 then we apply polynomial interpolation with 4 points.
In other cases we apply linear interpolation.
After applying the interpolation or extrapolation above, we obtain y

as an estimate of the
transformed value function in the point F

. As a last step, we use the inverse transformation
H
 1
(y

) = J

, to get the required estimate of the original value function in the point F

.
Finally, if we additionally consider mean-reverting wage growth rates then the state space grid
becomes 2-dimensional. In the wage growth dimension we use linear interpolation with two
points, as there are no problems with asymptotes or abrupt changes of the value function. We
apply the transformation and interpolation methods as described previously in the fund value
dimension. We refer to Press e.a (1989) for an introduction to multi-dimensional interpolation.
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C Portfolio Separation in Discrete-Time
Given Assumption 4 and an additional linear approximation rule for discrete returns, we will
prove that three-fund separation holds for any investment objective. Fund separation results are
well known for log-normal return distributions in continuous time since Merton (1971), but to
our knowledge this is the rst proof for a discrete time model. In order to derive these results, we
rst apply the following linear approximation for the continuously compounded returns r
i;t+1
:
11
(1 +R
i;t+1
)
(1 + 
t+1
)
= e
r
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 
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(31)
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; for i = 0; 1; :::; I
Moreover, we assume that the nominal return of asset 0 is riskless: r
0;t+1
is constant for t =
0; 1; :::; T   1 and will be denoted by r
0
. This assumption is purely for notational convenience
and does not change our conclusions.
Consider the general rst-order condition for investment (10) at time t in the dynamic program-
ming recursion. We may formulate this equation as follows, using the denition of covariance:
0 = Cov
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  r
0
) + E
t
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F
]E
t
[r
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  r
0
]; for i = 1; 2; :::; I(32)
Given that the continuously compounded asset returns and wage growth rate are joint normally
distributed we apply Stein's Lemma
12
, yielding
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] = 0; for i = 1; 2; :::; I
Solving this equation for the vector of optimal portfolio weights w

t
we obtain:
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11
The proof presented here holds exactly, if the discretely compounded asset returns are generated by a multi-
variate normal distribution. We have to apply an additional approximation because we assume a multi-variate
log-normal distribution for the discrete asset returns.
12
Stein's Lemma states that Cov(f(X); Y ) = E(f
0
(X))Cov(X;Y ), for a dierentiable function f() and X;Y
bivariate normally distributed. A proof for the multi-variate case is available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1: Relative Risk Aversion Function for DRRA
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This gure shows the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (17) of utility function (16) as a function
of the wealth-income ratio F , for parameter values  =  0:5, p = 3 and  = 3.
Figure 2: Stock weight for DRRA
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This gure shows the fraction invested in stocks for constant relative risk aversion levels  =  3:5 (dotted
line) and  =  0:5 (dashed line) and decreasing relative risk aversion (solid curve). A more risk averse
investor dedicates less to stocks (28% for risk aversion level  =  3:5 compared to 90% for risk aversion level
 =  0:5). Moreover decreasing relative risk aversion implies that the investor desires less exposure to stocks
when real wealth drops.
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Figure 3: Stock weight for DRRA with stochastic wage growth (
S
= 0 and 
B
= 0:33)
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This gure shows the fraction invested in stocks when returns on bonds are positively correlated with wage
growth. The percentage of stocks in the optimal portfolio slightly decreases for increasing wage growth levels.
Figure 4: Stock weight for DRRA with stochastic wage growth (
S
= 0:33 and 
B
= 0)
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This gure shows the fraction invested in stocks when returns on stocks are positively correlated with wage
growth. Compared to Figure 3 the graph is shifted only in a parallel way, i.e. the weight increases generally
when stock returns are positively correlated with wage growth. Adjustments of the portfolio as a function of
the wage growth rate are small and comparable to Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Stock weight for Downside-Risk Objective
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This gure shows the fraction invested in stocks at time t = 0 as a function of the wealth-income ratio for risk
aversion parameters  = 16 (solid curve) and  = 64 (dotted line). Note that the investor cannot dedicate
more than 100% to stocks due to a borrowing constraint.
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Figure 6: Stock weight for CRRA with xed contribution rates
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Wealth−Income Ratio
Fr
ac
tio
n 
In
ve
ste
d 
in 
St
oc
ks
The gure shows the stock weight at time t = 0 for power-utility with risk aversion  =  0:5 (dashed line),
 =  2 (solid line) and  =  3:5 (dotted line), with a xed contribution rate of c
t
= 0:05 for t = 0; 1; :::; T 1.
Due to the xed contribution rate the portfolio weight of stocks increases at low levels of fund value (wealth-
to-income ratio).
Figure 7: Stock weight with HARA-utility over contribution rates
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The gure shows the fraction invested in stocks at time t = 0 for power-utility with  =  2 over fund value
and HARA-utility over contribution rates with  =  2:5 (dashed line),  2 (solid line) and  1:5 (dotted line).
The weight of stock increases to the upper bound 100% at low levels of fund value, due to the increasing
marginal value of the contribution payment.
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Figure 8: Contribution rates with HARA-utility
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Wealth−Income Ratio
Co
nt
rib
ut
ion
 R
at
e
The gure shows the contribution rate at time t = 0 for power-utility with  =  2 over fund value and
HARA-utility over contribution rates with  =  2:5 (dashed line),  2 (solid line) and  1:5 (dotted line).
The contribution rates decrease approximately linear as a function of fund value.
Figure 9: Stock weight at time t = 9,4 and 0 for DRRA utility
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Wealth−Income Ratio
Fr
ac
tio
n 
In
ve
ste
d 
in 
St
oc
ks
The gure shows the fraction invested in stocks for dierent investment horizons, given DRRA utility with
parameter values  =  0:5, p = 3 and  = 3. The dotted line represents the optimal fraction with only one
year left (t = 9). The dashed line correspond to an intermediate period (t = 4) and the solid line represents
the initial portfolio choice (t = 0).
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Figure 10: Stock weight at time t = 9,4 and 0 for CRRA utility, with a xed contribution rate
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The gure shows the fraction invested in stocks for dierent investment horizons, given CRRA utility with
risk aversion  =  2 and a xed contribution rate c
t
= 0:05 for t = 0; 1; :::; T   1. The dotted line represents
the optimal fraction with only one year left (t = 9). The dashed line correspond to an intermediate period
(t = 4) and the solid line represents the initial portfolio choice (t = 0).
Figure 11: Stock weight at time t = 9,4 and 0, with HARA utility over contribution rates
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The gure shows the fraction invested in stocks for dierent investment horizons, given CRRA utility with
risk aversion  =  2 and HARA-utility over contribution rates with  =  2. The dotted line represents the
optimal fraction with only one year left (t = 9). The dashed line correspond to an intermediate period (t = 4)
and the solid line represents the initial portfolio choice (t = 0).
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Figure 12: Contribution rate at time t = 9,4 and 0, with HARA utility over contribution rates
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The gure shows the contribution rate for dierent investment horizons, given CRRA utility with risk aversion
 =  2 and HARA-utility over contribution rates with  =  2. The dotted line represents the optimal
contribution rate with only one year left (t = 9). The dashed line correspond to an intermediate period
(t = 4) and the solid line represents the initial portfolio choice (t = 0).
Figure 13: Stock weight at time t = 9,4 and 0, with intertemporal utility over fund value
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The gure shows the fraction invested in stocks for dierent investment horizons, given intertemporal mea-
surement of CRRA utility over fund values with risk aversion  =  2 and HARA-utility over contribution
rates with  =  2. The dotted line represents the optimal fraction with only one year left (t = 9). The
dashed line correspond to an intermediate period (t = 4) and the solid line represents the initial portfolio
choice (t = 0).
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Figure 14: Contribution rate at time t = 9,4 and 0, with intertemporal utility over fund value
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The gure shows the optimal contribution rate for dierent investment horizons, given intertemporal mea-
surement of CRRA utility over fund values with risk aversion  =  2 and HARA-utility over contribution
rates with  =  2. The dotted line represents the optimal contribution rate with only one year left (t = 9).
The dashed line correspond to an intermediate period (t = 4) and the solid line represents the initial portfolio
choice (t = 0). Due to the intertemporal measurement of utility over fund value, the contribution rates
increase for longer investment horizons (contrary to the results in Figure 12).
Figure 15: Stock weight for CRRA with a lower bound on funding payments
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This gure shows the fraction invested in stocks with lower bound c = 0 on contribution rates. The upward
part of the smile is due to the lower bound on funding payments, which provide a cushion against losses.
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Figure 16: Stock weight for CRRA with an upper bound on fund value
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This gure shows the fraction invested in stocks with an upper bound F = 2 on fund values, enforced with
negative contribution rates (i.e. refunds). Beyond the maximum allowed fund value F = 2 the stock weight
becomes constant at a low level.
